Abstract: Purpose/Significance At present, China's construction industry has entered an era of stock competition. Despite the continuous improvement of the country's supervision level, construction safety tragedies caused by illegal operation of construction companies under heavy pressure still occur frequently. How to improve the effect of building quality supervision has become a hotspot in academic circles. Design/Methodology This paper considers the information asymmetry between the owner and the construction company about the construction quality at the bidding stage and the constraint effect of reputation effect on the market behavior of the construction company, and establishes a multi-period reputation effect model. The game analysis is carried out on the loose-contract work team and the regular enterprises that attach importance to the restriction of reputation effect. Finally, taking the collapse of the Mianyang Panjiang Bridge as an example, the theoretical results are verified. Findings/Conclusions Without considering the multi-period reputation effect, when the penalties for non-compliance of construction enterprises are less than the "excess profits" obtained from the violations, the market behavior of construction enterprises cannot be restrained by supervision alone, and the supervision fails. Considering the reputation effect, the construction party's "stealing and cutting materials" behavior will lead to a decrease in future earnings, which plays a role in regulating market behavior.