林萍, 李雪白, 蒋清泉. 管理防御视角下 CEO 背景特征与零杠杆策略选择———基于沪深两市 A 股上市公司的实证研究[J]. 电子科技大学学报社科版, 2020, 22(4): 58-66. DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2020)-3007
引用本文: 林萍, 李雪白, 蒋清泉. 管理防御视角下 CEO 背景特征与零杠杆策略选择———基于沪深两市 A 股上市公司的实证研究[J]. 电子科技大学学报社科版, 2020, 22(4): 58-66. DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2020)-3007
LIN Ping, LI Xue-bai, JIANG Qing-quan. CEO Background Features and Zero-Leverage Strategy Selection from the Perspective of Management Defense[J]. Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(SOCIAL SCIENCES EDITION), 2020, 22(4): 58-66. DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2020)-3007
Citation: LIN Ping, LI Xue-bai, JIANG Qing-quan. CEO Background Features and Zero-Leverage Strategy Selection from the Perspective of Management Defense[J]. Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(SOCIAL SCIENCES EDITION), 2020, 22(4): 58-66. DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2020)-3007

管理防御视角下 CEO 背景特征与零杠杆策略选择—基于沪深两市 A 股上市公司的实证研究

CEO Background Features and Zero-Leverage Strategy Selection from the Perspective of Management Defense

  • 摘要:
    目的/意义以管理防御作为研究视角,分析国有控股与非国有控股上市公司CEO背景特征对零杠杆策略选择是否存在一定差异性,现有文献鲜有研究。
    设计/方法以沪深两市A股2008~2018上市公司为研究样本,从管理防御的视角研究公司治理、CEO背景特征和公司零杠杆策略的关系。
    结论/发现研究表明:CEO背景特征会显著影响公司零杠杆策略选择:CEO年龄越大、学历越低、任期越长,管理防御程度越高,公司采取零杠杆策略的可能性越大;股权集中度在一定程度上削弱了CEO背景特征与公司零杠杆策略的相关性,增大管理防御的实施难度。进一步区分产权性质后发现,国企的CEO背景特征对零杠杆策略影响不显著,非国企中CEO背景特征对零杠杆策略影响以及股权集中度的调节作用都比较显著。

     

    Abstract: Purpose/Significance From the perspective of management entrenchment, there is little research in the existing literature whether the CEO characteristics of government-owned and non-government-owned listed companies have certain differences in the choice of zero-leverage strategies. Design/Methodology This paper uses the 2008~2018 A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen as the research sample, and studies the relationship between corporate governance, CEO background characteristics and the company's zero leverage strategy from the perspective of management defense. Findings/Conclusions Research shows that the background characteristics of the CEO will significantly affect the company's choice of zero leverage strategy: the older the CEO, the lower the education level, the longer the tenure, and the higher the degree of management defense, the greater the likelihood that the company will adopt a zero leverage strategy. The degree of equity concentration weakens the relevance of the CEO's background characteristics to the company's zero-leverage strategy to a certain extent, and increases the difficulty of implementing management defense. After further distinguishing the nature of property rights, it is found that the background characteristics of CEOs of state-owned enterprises have no significant effect on the zero-leverage strategy, and the effects of CEO background characteristics of non-state-owned enterprises on the zero-leverage strategy and the adjustment of equity concentration are more significant.

     

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