邓晓岚, 魏丹丹. 环境不确定性、高管议价能力与运气薪酬[J]. 电子科技大学学报社科版, 2020, 22(3): 77-86. DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2020)-6008
引用本文: 邓晓岚, 魏丹丹. 环境不确定性、高管议价能力与运气薪酬[J]. 电子科技大学学报社科版, 2020, 22(3): 77-86. DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2020)-6008
DENG Xiao-lan, WEI Dan-dan. Environmental Uncertainty, Executive Bargaining Power and Pay for Luck—An Empirical Study of Listed Companies in China[J]. Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(SOCIAL SCIENCES EDITION), 2020, 22(3): 77-86. DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2020)-6008
Citation: DENG Xiao-lan, WEI Dan-dan. Environmental Uncertainty, Executive Bargaining Power and Pay for Luck—An Empirical Study of Listed Companies in China[J]. Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(SOCIAL SCIENCES EDITION), 2020, 22(3): 77-86. DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2020)-6008

环境不确定性、高管议价能力与运气薪酬

Environmental Uncertainty, Executive Bargaining Power and Pay for Luck—An Empirical Study of Listed Companies in China

  • 摘要:
    目的/意义近几年,有一种特殊的高管薪酬现象引起国内外学者的关注,即公司所处的行业面临着一些不可控的、外生性的冲击因素,诸如原料与产品价格变化等,这些因素影响着整个行业的业绩,被称之为“运气” 。高管们凭借“运气业绩”而获得额外的报酬,这种现象被称为“运气薪酬”。
    设计/方法以2012~2018年我国沪深A股上市公司为样本,将公司的整体业绩分离为两个部分:由“运气”产生的业绩和由管理者才能(或努力)产生的业绩,检验了高管议价能力、环境不确定性对高管“运气薪酬”的影响。
    结论/发现研究结果表明,议价能力较强的高管,其薪酬对“运气业绩”的敏感性较高,而环境不确定性降低了高管薪酬对“运气业绩”的敏感性,即当环境不确定性程度较高时,较高的议价能力并不能带来较高的“运气薪酬”。拓展了环境不确定性与高管薪酬相关性方面的研究,也为企业如何在不确定性环境中,根据高管的议价能力设计薪酬方案提供了启示。

     

    Abstract: Purpose/Significance In recent years, a special phenomenon of executive compensation has attracted the attention of scholars at home and abroad, that is, the overall performance of the industry is facing some uncontrollable and exogenous impact factors, such as changes in raw materials and product prices, which is called "luck". The "pay for luck" is the extra reward that executives get from lucky performance. Design/Methodology The sample of this paper is A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2012 to 2018. The company's overall performance is divided into two parts: the performance generated by luck and the performance generated by the talents (or efforts) of managers. Based on these, we test the impact of bargaining power and environmental uncertainty on pay for luck. Findings/Conclusion The results show that the compensation of executives with strong bargaining power is more sensitive to lucky performance, while the environmental uncertainty reduces the sensitivity of the compensation of executives to lucky performance. That is, when the environmental uncertainty is higher, a higher bargaining power does not bring higher lucky compensation. This paper expands the research on the correlation between environmental uncertainty and executive compensation, and provides inspiration for companies to design compensation schemes according to the bargaining power of executives in the uncertain environment.

     

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