陈哲, 陈国宏. 考虑谈判权力的供应链企业自愿型环境规制参与决策协调研究[J]. 电子科技大学学报社科版, 2023, 25(1): 85-96. DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2021)-5017
引用本文: 陈哲, 陈国宏. 考虑谈判权力的供应链企业自愿型环境规制参与决策协调研究[J]. 电子科技大学学报社科版, 2023, 25(1): 85-96. DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2021)-5017
CHEN Zhe, CHEN Guo-hong. Research on the Supply Chain Enterprises’ Voluntary Environmental Regulation Participation Decision and Coordination Considering Bargaining Power[J]. Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(SOCIAL SCIENCES EDITION), 2023, 25(1): 85-96. DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2021)-5017
Citation: CHEN Zhe, CHEN Guo-hong. Research on the Supply Chain Enterprises’ Voluntary Environmental Regulation Participation Decision and Coordination Considering Bargaining Power[J]. Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(SOCIAL SCIENCES EDITION), 2023, 25(1): 85-96. DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2021)-5017

考虑谈判权力的供应链企业自愿型环境规制参与决策协调研究

Research on the Supply Chain Enterprises’ Voluntary Environmental Regulation Participation Decision and Coordination Considering Bargaining Power

  • 摘要:
    目的/意义我国正处于经济社会发展全面绿色转型时期,探究供应链企业参与自愿型环境规制的促进机制对我国环境治理绩效提升有积极意义。
    设计/方法通过构建了一个二级供应链模型,研究制造商参与自愿型环境规制决策机制并讨论政府补贴对企业参与规制决策的影响,进而引入考虑谈判权力影响的收益分享契约,探究供应链协调机制。
    结论/发现(1)制造商参与自愿型环境规制受到消费者信任度、绿色产品偏好的正向影响,但消费者价格敏感度与参与度反向相关;政府补贴有助于促进企业参与自愿型环境规制,对于供应链企业形成有效激励;(2)谈判权力对收益分享契约协调作用具有影响,但存在一定的阈值,当零售商谈判权力高于该临界值时,制造商自愿型参与度及双方利润水平均得到提升,供应链实现协调优化。

     

    Abstract: Purpose/Significance In the period of comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development, the participation of supply chain enterprises in voluntary environmental regulation has positive significance for the improvement of environmental governance performance in China. Design/Methodology This paper constructs a two-level supply chain model to study the decision-making mechanism of manufacturers’ participation in voluntary environmental regulation and the influence of government subsidies in enterprises’ participation decision-making, and then introduces a revenue-sharing contract considering the bargaining power to coordinate the supply chain. Conclusions/Findings (1) Consumer trust, green product preference positively affect manufacturer’s participation, while consumer price sensitivity is inversely related to participation. Government subsidy has effective incentives for supply chain enterprises, which helps to promote enterprises’ participation in voluntary environmental regulation. (2) The bargaining power balance is necessary for supply chain coordination. The manufacturer’s voluntary participation and the profit of both sides will be improved when the retailer’s bargaining power exceeds a certain threshold, and then the supply chain coordination and optimization will be achieved.

     

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