张庭溢, 翁钰贞, 计国君. 嵌入式社区养老服务供应链运作博弈演化的系统动力学分析[J]. 电子科技大学学报社科版, 2023, 25(3): 69-82. DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2022)-4003
引用本文: 张庭溢, 翁钰贞, 计国君. 嵌入式社区养老服务供应链运作博弈演化的系统动力学分析[J]. 电子科技大学学报社科版, 2023, 25(3): 69-82. DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2022)-4003
ZHANG Ting-yi, WENG Yu-zhen, JI Guo-jun. System Dynamics Analysis of Operational Game Evolution on Supply Chain of Embedded Community Service for the Elderly[J]. Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(SOCIAL SCIENCES EDITION), 2023, 25(3): 69-82. DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2022)-4003
Citation: ZHANG Ting-yi, WENG Yu-zhen, JI Guo-jun. System Dynamics Analysis of Operational Game Evolution on Supply Chain of Embedded Community Service for the Elderly[J]. Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(SOCIAL SCIENCES EDITION), 2023, 25(3): 69-82. DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2022)-4003

嵌入式社区养老服务供应链运作博弈演化的系统动力学分析

System Dynamics Analysis of Operational Game Evolution on Supply Chain of Embedded Community Service for the Elderly

  • 摘要:
    目的/意义在我国老龄化日益严重的情况下,提供适当的养老服务解决养老问题变得极为重要。
    设计/方法针对嵌入式社区养老存在的运作困境,运用演化博弈理论,分析政府、养老社区和服务供应商之间的动态博弈过程,构建三者在不同策略下的演化博弈模型,并结合系统动力学对三方策略选择的动态博弈进行仿真分析。
    结论/发现结果最终会达到各方选择“政府采取激励机制、养老社区购买高质量产品、服务供应商不欺诈”的均衡状态,政府行为在养老机制中发挥着重要作用。政府直接影响养老社区和服务提供商的策略选择,其合理的监督机制和措施能够促进社区养老服务供应链持续健康发展;各方对相关的外部变量具有高度敏感性,最终策略受多个变量的共同影响,因此需在政府、养老社区和服务供应商共同努力下,解决社会上的养老服务问题,从而增加老年人的幸福感。

     

    Abstract: Purpose/Significance With the increasingly serious situation of aging in our country, it has become extremely important to provide appropriate elderly care services to solve the problem of elderly care. Design/Methodology In view of the operation dilemma of embedded community for the elderly, the dynamic game process among the government, elderly communities and service providers is analyzed by using evolutionary game theory, the evolutionary game models of the three under different strategies are constructed, and the dynamic game of the three-party strategy selection is simulated and analyzed based on system dynamics. Conclusions/Findings The result will eventually reach an equilibrium state where all parties choose “the government adopts an incentive mechanism, the elderly community purchases high-quality products, and service providers do not cheat”. Government behavior plays an important role in the elderly care mechanism. The government directly influences the pension community and service provider’s strategic choice, and its reasonable supervision mechanism and measures can promote the sustainable and healthy development of community pension service supply chain. All parties are highly sensitive to relevant external variables, and the final strategy is jointly affected by multiple variables. Therefore, the government, elderly communities and service providers should make joint efforts to solve the problem of elderly services in society, so as to increase the happiness of the elderly.

     

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