Abstract: Purpose/Significance The government, enterprises and poor households are the three main stakeholders in targeted poverty alleviation. Their decision-making behavior will directly affect the effectiveness of targeted poverty alleviation. The purpose of this article is to better coordinate the relationships among various stakeholders in targeted poverty alleviation, formulate related policies for targeted poverty alleviation, and improve the efficiency of targeted poverty alleviation, Design/Methodology This paper discusses the three-party evolutionary poverty alleviation by constructing a three-party evolutionary game model. The effect of decision-making behavior, and select samples to simulate the model. Findings/Conclusions The numerical results show that the government’s poverty alleviation funds, the profits of enterprises participating in poverty alleviation, and the rewards of poor households’ active poverty alleviation are important factors affecting the strategic choice of the three-party game players. The government’s poverty alleviation funds have a positive impact on enterprises’ involvement in poverty alleviation, and it is easy for poor households to get rid of poverty. The benefits of enterprises participating in poverty alleviation will encourage enterprises to actively participate in poverty alleviation and create employment opportunities for poor households to actively escape poverty. The income of poor households from active poverty alleviation has a small impact on government behavior, but it will increase the cost of enterprises and be reluctant to participate in poverty alleviation. Therefore, when the size of the poverty alleviation funds allocated by the government is moderate, the returns from the enterprises’ participation in poverty alleviation are considerable, and the poor households’ active poverty alleviation returns are moderate, and the Pareto optimal state of precision poverty alleviation can be achieved.