王芳, 张恒杰, 朱艳, 等. 碳限额约束下双渠道供应链减排成本分担演化博弈研究[J]. 电子科技大学学报(社科版), 2024, 26(3): 1-14.. DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2024)-3001
引用本文: 王芳, 张恒杰, 朱艳, 等. 碳限额约束下双渠道供应链减排成本分担演化博弈研究[J]. 电子科技大学学报(社科版), 2024, 26(3): 1-14.. DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2024)-3001
WANG Fang, ZHANG Heng-jie, ZHU Yan, DONG Yu-cheng. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Emission Reduction Cost Sharing in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain Under Carbon Cap Constraints[J]. Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(SOCIAL SCIENCES EDITION). DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2024)-3001
Citation: WANG Fang, ZHANG Heng-jie, ZHU Yan, DONG Yu-cheng. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Emission Reduction Cost Sharing in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain Under Carbon Cap Constraints[J]. Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(SOCIAL SCIENCES EDITION). DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2024)-3001

碳限额约束下双渠道供应链减排成本分担演化博弈研究

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Emission Reduction Cost Sharing in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain Under Carbon Cap Constraints

  • 摘要: 碳限额背景下,考虑到碳减排技术的高成本,双渠道供应链中的制造商倾向于与零售商共担成本以减少企业风险。对制造商和零售商碳减排成本分担冲突问题进行研究,有助于供应链协同减排,促进国家实现碳减排目标。本文针对一个制造商和一个零售商组成的双渠道供应链系统,运用演化博弈模型研究碳限额约束下的减排成本分担及减排策略(投资碳减排技术和购买碳排放配额)选择问题,并分析价格调控机制对演化稳定策略的影响。研究发现:存在(制造商不投资,零售商不投资)、(制造商投资,零售商不投资)和(制造商不投资,零售商投资)三种演化稳定策略;进一步,当引入价格调控机制时,双渠道供应链系统在策略(制造商投资,零售商投资)上也能形成稳定。此外,通过仿真分析验证了上述理论结果,并讨论了不同情形下的产品批发价格、减排技术成本、碳交易成本、成本分担比例对制造商和零售商共同分担碳减排技术成本意愿的影响。

     

    Abstract: Excessive emission of the greenhouse gas, whose main component is carbon dioxide, has led to the problem of global warming and attracted global attention. Supply chains generate large amounts of carbon dioxide during manufacturing, so there is an urgent need to reduce supply chain carbon emissions. There are mainly two carbon emission reduction strategies: carbon emission reduction technology and carbon trading. Considering the high cost of carbon reduction technology, a manufacturer in dual-channel supply chains tends to share costs with retailer to reduce corporate risks. Therefore, the core issue of supply chain carbon emission reduction is how to encourage manufacturer and retailer to jointly invest in carbon emission reduction technology. This paper studies the emission reduction cost sharing based on evolutionary game, and further analyze the effect of price regulation mechanism on evolutionary stability strategies. There are three evolutionary stability strategies: (1) manufacturer invests and retailer doesn’t invest, (2) manufacturer doesn’t invest and retailer invests, (3) neither manufacturer or retailer invest; further when introducing price regulation mechanism, the dual-channel supply chain system will stabilize on the strategy that both manufacturer and retailer both invest. In addition, the simulation analysis is used to verify the above theoretical results, and analyze the impact of some paraments on manufacturers and retailers sharing the carbon emission reduction technology costs.

     

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