Abstract: Considering the reputation effect of both medical tourism facilitator and service provider on the medical tourism supply chain to reduce risks during the operation of the medical tourism supply chain. Dual reputation incentive models under complete information and incomplete information are established. And the optimal incentive mechanism decisions of the facilitator are obtained by using the optimization theory, which are compared with the situation without considering the dual reputation effect. In the case of complete information, medical tourism facilitator can encourage service provider to work hard only through fixed remuneration, and the optimal incentive contract is not related to the risk aversion of service provider and exogenous uncertainties; while in the case of incomplete information, under certain conditions, the dual reputation incentive mechanism can improve the service provider’s effort level and incentive reward, as well as the expected benefits of the facilitator , that is, the dual reputation incentive mechanism can achieve Pareto improvement of medical tourism supply chain. At this time, the risk aversion of service provider and exogenous uncertainties have a significant impact on the optimal allocation of incentive mechanism.