Reciprocal Game Model of Safety Production Cooperative Relationship between Local Government and Coal Mine

The paper established the reciprocal game model of collaborative action in production safety between local governments and coalmines. In order to get rid of so-called “prisoner's dilemma” faced by the coalmine production safety, the local government can design the appropriate strategy to reach the Pareto cooperative outcome, and change the payoffs by providing public security investment and market intervention measures. Taking the martyrdom game as a meta-game and designing two order strategies, the “prisoner's dilemma” martyrdom game is extended to the static game with 16×4 strategies profiles. The local government can choose the strong regulatory strategy, considering the coalmine takes the reciprocal strategy of safety production investment, i.e., facing the strong supervision the coalmine should increase safety input, and it is in reverse. Finally, based on the case of “11.10” Shizong mine accident, the paper discusses the measures to improve the level of coal mine production safety including strategy design and payoff adjustment such as effective taxation and allowance.