Differential Game Model of Group Emergencies Considering the Degree of Social Rule of Law and Police Disposal

Group emergencies belong to the internal contradictions of the people. They have the characteristics of being dominated by economic interests and having more people’s concentration in a certain period of time. According to the requirements of " leading cadres should apply legal thinking and method to resolve contradictions”, the paper constructs a differential game model for emergency response of mass incidents. Considering the two exogenous variables of the degree of social rule of law and the handling of police force, we strive to achieve the goal of minimizing total social loss through financial compensation. The results show that when the aggregated population is at a low level, the local government has more police deployment to the crowds, and the fewer the crowds, the more financial compensation the government gives; the higher the degree of social rule of law will reduce the aggregate population to the local population but increase the financial compensation; the increase in unit social losses will increase the proportion of the aggregate population to the total local population, but reduce the financial compensation. When the crowds are at a high level, the aggregated population increases with the increase of the local government’s police force deployment, and the financial compensation decrease with the increase of the government’s police force deployment; the higher degree of social rule of law will increase the proportion of the aggregated population to the local total population and reduce the financial compensation; the increase in unit social losses will reduce the proportion of the aggregated population to the total local population, but increase the financial compensation.