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CHEN Zhe, CHEN Guo-hong. Research on the Supply Chain Enterprises’ Voluntary Environmental Regulation Participation Decision and Coordination Considering Bargaining Power[J]. Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(SOCIAL SCIENCES EDITION), 2023, 25(1): 85-96. DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2021)-5017
Citation: CHEN Zhe, CHEN Guo-hong. Research on the Supply Chain Enterprises’ Voluntary Environmental Regulation Participation Decision and Coordination Considering Bargaining Power[J]. Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(SOCIAL SCIENCES EDITION), 2023, 25(1): 85-96. DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2021)-5017

Research on the Supply Chain Enterprises’ Voluntary Environmental Regulation Participation Decision and Coordination Considering Bargaining Power

  • Purpose/Significance In the period of comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development, the participation of supply chain enterprises in voluntary environmental regulation has positive significance for the improvement of environmental governance performance in China. Design/Methodology This paper constructs a two-level supply chain model to study the decision-making mechanism of manufacturers’ participation in voluntary environmental regulation and the influence of government subsidies in enterprises’ participation decision-making, and then introduces a revenue-sharing contract considering the bargaining power to coordinate the supply chain. Conclusions/Findings (1) Consumer trust, green product preference positively affect manufacturer’s participation, while consumer price sensitivity is inversely related to participation. Government subsidy has effective incentives for supply chain enterprises, which helps to promote enterprises’ participation in voluntary environmental regulation. (2) The bargaining power balance is necessary for supply chain coordination. The manufacturer’s voluntary participation and the profit of both sides will be improved when the retailer’s bargaining power exceeds a certain threshold, and then the supply chain coordination and optimization will be achieved.
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