Evolution Mechanism and Collaborative Governance of Network Public Opinion Towards Public Emergencies Based on Multiple Repeated Games

Purpose/Significance Revealing the evolution and governance mechanism of network public opinion towards public emergencies from the perspective of multiple games among participants will help to reduce the governance cycle and cost, but few existing studies have been made. Design/Methodology The first game model between network media and government is constructed, and the Nash equilibrium solution and its influencing factors are analyzed. Secondly, by considering the repeatability of players’ strategies, the model is extended to the multiple repeated game model, and the conditions for the players to realize cooperation under each game are discussed. Finally, taking the network public opinion caused by the Changchun Changsheng Biological Vaccine Fraud in 2018 as an example, the effectiveness of theoretical research is verified, and the impact of the popularity of public opinion and the potential punishment suffered by network media on the game equilibrium are examined. Conclusions/Findings It is easy to promote the long-term cooperation between the players when the discount factor of the income obtained by network media does not exceed a certain threshold; the smaller the popularity of the spread of public opinion or the greater the potential punishment suffered by network media, the better it is to promote the long-term cooperation.