Evolutionary Game Analysis of Emission Reduction Cost Sharing in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain Under Carbon Cap Constraints

Excessive emission of the greenhouse gas, whose main component is carbon dioxide, has led to the problem of global warming and attracted global attention. Supply chains generate large amounts of carbon dioxide during manufacturing, so there is an urgent need to reduce supply chain carbon emissions. There are mainly two carbon emission reduction strategies: carbon emission reduction technology and carbon trading. Considering the high cost of carbon reduction technology, a manufacturer in dual-channel supply chains tends to share costs with retailer to reduce corporate risks. Therefore, the core issue of supply chain carbon emission reduction is how to encourage manufacturer and retailer to jointly invest in carbon emission reduction technology. This paper studies the emission reduction cost sharing based on evolutionary game, and further analyzes the effect of price regulation mechanism on evolutionary stability strategies. There are three evolutionary stability strategies: (1) manufacturer invests and retailer doesn’t invest, (2) manufacturer doesn’t invest and retailer invests, (3) neither manufacturer or retailer invest. Further more, when introducing price regulation mechanism, the dual-channel supply chain system will stabilize on the strategy that both manufacturer and retailer invest. In addition, the simulation analysis is used to verify the above theoretical results, and analyze the impact of some paraments on manufacturers and retailers sharing the carbon emission reduction technology costs.