Can an AI Agent be a Moral SubjectAn Analysis Based on Marxist Practical Philosophy

The philosophical inquiry into whether artificial intelligence agents can become moral subjects must be examined through the lens of Marxist practical philosophy. Moral subjectivity is rooted in the uniquely human activity of sensuous objectification—that is, the transformative practice of material production through which humans reshape the world and themselves, thereby developing capacities for intentionality, value-based decision-making, and social responsibility. In contrast, artificial intelligence (AI) is inherently an instrumental entity embodying objectified intellectual power. Its actions are doubly constrained by algorithmic and data-driven determinism, lacking the autonomous purposiveness grounded in practical freedom; its existence remains detached from the network of social production relations, rendering it incapable of bearing historically formed moral emotions or responsibilities. Granting AI the status of a moral subject would not only be ontologically invalid but also induce a new form of alienation: the surrender of human moral agency would atrophy subjectivity, while the reification of responsibility would obscure real social power structures, ultimately deviating from the goal of human emancipation. The ultimate question of technological civilization has never been whether machines can become moral agents, but how humanity can harness its own creations to transform them into instruments of emancipation—tools that extend freedom rather than dissolve human subjectivity.