叶勇, 杨雪津. 演化博弈视角下国家工作人员腐败行为选择机理研究[J]. 电子科技大学学报社科版, 2016, 18(5): 80-84. DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2016)05-0080-05
引用本文: 叶勇, 杨雪津. 演化博弈视角下国家工作人员腐败行为选择机理研究[J]. 电子科技大学学报社科版, 2016, 18(5): 80-84. DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2016)05-0080-05
YE Yong, YANG Xue-jin. Study on Behavior of Corruption of State Personnel in the Perspective of Evolutionary Game[J]. Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(SOCIAL SCIENCES EDITION), 2016, 18(5): 80-84. DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2016)05-0080-05
Citation: YE Yong, YANG Xue-jin. Study on Behavior of Corruption of State Personnel in the Perspective of Evolutionary Game[J]. Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(SOCIAL SCIENCES EDITION), 2016, 18(5): 80-84. DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2016)05-0080-05

演化博弈视角下国家工作人员腐败行为选择机理研究

Study on Behavior of Corruption of State Personnel in the Perspective of Evolutionary Game

  • 摘要: 腐败是当今社会的热点及瓶颈问题。运用演化博弈的方法,将国家工作人员群体置于一个不断渐进的演化系统中,结合现实情况建立国家工作人员在面对腐败时,不同群体之间的动态演化模型,求出其演化的长期均衡策略,并分析腐败成本、腐败收益、腐败被查处的概率以及举报腐败行为的奖励等相关参数对演化博弈模型的影响大小和方向,进而提出了克服国家工作人员内部腐败的对策建议。

     

    Abstract: Corruption is a hot topic and bottleneck problem in today's society. Based on the approach of evolutionary game, putting state personnel into a progressive evolution system, this paper establishes a dynamic evolution model between different groups of state personnel in the face of corruption according to the reality, calculates the long-term equilibrium strategy of these two groups in the evolution process, and then analyzes the effect of relevant parameters such as corruption cost, corruption gains, probability of corruption being investigated and reward for information on the evolutionary game model, finally, makes suggestions on how to overcome the corruption of state personnel.

     

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