声誉、重复博弈与双边市场合作均衡 ——以淘宝在线交易平台企业为例

Reputation, Repeated-Games and Cooperation Equilibrium of Two-Sided Markets—A Case Study of Taobao

  • 摘要: 本文通过一个简单的两阶段博弈模型证明了在不完全信息条件下,重复博弈能实现博弈双方的合作均衡。淘宝是一个典型的平台企业,它提供了双边市场合作均衡的案例:卖家通过交易累积起声誉,并成为公共知识迅速传播,诚信使卖家获得买家重复购买的激励;欺骗使卖家受到丧失未来收益的惩罚。声誉机制为合约提供了隐性激励并促成交易双方实现了合作均衡。支付宝作为第三方担保工具,最大限度地减少了网络交易中的风险。淘宝有效地解决了网络社区的信任问题,这将为中国社会信用环境的重构提供有益的借鉴

     

    Abstract: Using a two-stage game model, this paper proves that repeated game can realize cooperation equilibrium under asymmetry information. Taobao is a platform helping buyers and sellers building trust each other. The sellers will have a good reputation which will get more orders if he would be honest, or be punished if dishonest. Reputation provides incentives to achieve cooperation equilibrium. Taobao sets up a guarantee system to keep away the opportunism of the buyers. The case of Taobao not only provides a sample of solving the trust problems of network, but also gives a good sample to our society.

     

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