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LU Ying-jin, DENG Yu-qin, XU Xue-feng. Research on Incentive Mechanism of Medical Service Supply Chain Under Information Asymmetry[J]. Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(SOCIAL SCIENCES EDITION), 2019, 21(5): 88-95. DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2018)-1009
Citation: LU Ying-jin, DENG Yu-qin, XU Xue-feng. Research on Incentive Mechanism of Medical Service Supply Chain Under Information Asymmetry[J]. Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(SOCIAL SCIENCES EDITION), 2019, 21(5): 88-95. DOI: 10.14071/j.1008-8105(2018)-1009

Research on Incentive Mechanism of Medical Service Supply Chain Under Information Asymmetry

  • The information asymmetry between the supply and demand parties is the bottleneck of the treatment resources matching of classified diagnosis, and it is also a difficult problem for the coordination of the supply chain of medical services. Applying the principal-agent theory, aiming at the incentive problem of medical service providers, through the research of medical service quality improvement path based on the best effort level of medical service institutions, we studied how to maximize the benefits of medical service supply chain, continuously improve the reputation of supply chain of medical service and promote healthy and sustainable development of health care reform. Sensitivity analysis shows that doctor commission rates and efforts have an important impact on the health care supply chain operations, and improving the rewards of medical services can improve the doctor's medical service efforts. The elasticity analysis shows that the medical service supply chain incentive mechanism can improve the reward factor of medical services and the doctor's commission rate, and reduce the fixed payment paid to doctors.
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